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From Meaning to Form and Back Again

Michael McOmber

INTRODUCTION

his paper discusses the advantages of a
grammar that places Logical Form as
the initial component (Early Logical
Form) rather than in the later dovetail position of the Government-Binding model of
Chomsky, or after Spell-Out in his
Minimalist program of the 90s (Late Logical
Form). Chomsky's interpretivism runs from
form to meaning only, whereas the production model I propose here runs from meaning to form for the encoder / speaker and then
back again from form to meaning for the
decoder /listener. By comparison, Government Binding scrambles half of production.
I set the stage in the first section by
rehearsing the relevant principles of
Government Binding (GB) and Minimality
that I will refer to, in addition to other general arguments which I claim make for good
grammar-an overriding principle is the
time-honored philosophy of economy in
Occam's Razor, which eschews redundancy
and wastage. In the second section I focus in
on specific data from Kenstowicz's analysis
of Bani-Hassan Arabic, which includes a crucially overt scope marker. I show that in a
Late Logical Form model, the grammar runs
into a paradox when it comes time to insert
the scope marker. At the crux of the problem
is the gnawing fact that, even though interpretation is not supposed to occur until (Late)
Logical Form, our grammarian becomes the
proverbial "man who knew too much" when
trying to achieve some explanatory adequacy

T

DLLS 2000

on what is happening. That is, he must rely
on semantics to explain the insertion, and yet
the interpretation to provide it does not occur
until after he has completed the step. He
essentially knows too much, too soon of the
eventual meaning, none of which, in fact, has
been computed yet, since it must wait for Late
Logical Form to compose the interpretation.
Samples of other fatal consequences of
Late Logical Form are presented in the third
section, including reconstruction effects, disanaphora, and the ironies of defective convergence and the procrastination principle in
a grammar that claims its own appeal to
"Economy of Derivation and Representation" (Chomsky 1995, chap. 2).
Finally I recapitulate conclusions in the
fourth section: Early Logical Form provides
more efficiency, therefore higher descriptive
and explanatory adequacy. My provocative
plea is to abandon interpretivism and pursue
a deterministic production model.
THE PREMISES

As this is essentially a rebuttal of
Chomskyanism, I begin with the more fully
articulated Government-Binding model of
his Transformational grammar as a starting
point. Although his minimality program
promises to be different, all indications are
that he has maintained a late interpretive
logic there as well. Therefore, what I have to
say on Government Binding still holds true
of more recent development. The dovetail
point at S-Structure acts too much like the
Spell-Out point to his new interfaces.
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It makes for stronger rebuttal to start
with Chomsky's own definitions and
constructs (especially as perceived by his
adherents) and then show how these lead
to contradictions and internal inconsistencies, with his own theory to lead the
way, "hoist with his own petard" (Hamlet
I1I:4). Here then follow several guiding
principles and premises from Government Binding which we crucially refer to
during our discussion.
The Purpose of Logical Form
The function of Logical Form (LF) is
to provide a component that is "interpretive in nature [and which] assigns ... a
semantic representation" (Ouhalla 1994,
46) to the various structures which the
grammar has generated. It is the "level
where meaning relations are determined"
(92). One of these interpretations, for
example, is to determine scope: "The
scope of A is the set of nodes that A c-commands in the LF representation" (133,
emphasis added).
What bothers me the most about post
hoc assignment of semantic representation is the entailment that I must be juggling words around, applying rules and
making adjustments without knowing
anything about what the thing is intended to mean. In fact, I am unable to find
room for any semantic intension whatsoever in Chomsky. Is Transformational
Grammar (TG) claiming that the rules up
till S-Structure are totally devoid of any
semantic considerations whatsoever?
That is how extreme this position seems
to be. How then did I decide what to pull
from the lexicon in the first place? Is that
random? If I pull out the lexeme house
surely it is because I intend to refer to
house. Why pull out terms I intend not to
mention?
The other anomaly here is the modus
operandi of interpretivism itself. In a nearFreudian denial, proponents of GB claim
that theirs is not a production model.
That stipulation is to excuse them from
addressing the issue in the preceding

paragraph. However, they fail to realize
that a production model has two parts.
As I move from Meaning to Form, (the
part which TG patently dismisses as out
of bounds) I, the speaker/encoder,
choose a thought, then formulate and
utter my message. At that point, it is
received by the listener / decoder who
does in fact have the task of interpreting
the message. This is done by running the
given message backwards through the rules.
That is, (s)he takes the utterance and
reconstructs what the underlying thought
must have been. My point is that interpretation is necessarily a function in the
production model. It is precisely half the
production, and it is inside out. In order
to surgically remove his GB portion of
language, from the entirety of language
production, as Chomsky is wont to do, he
must explain along the way (or at least
stipulate) how the relationship between
these two allows for this removal. What
is the point of having it survive on its
own? Does it not eventually reconnect
into the whole? To simply divorce a portion of grammar from the rest of human
language production, without addressing
such issues otherwise, makes generative
grammar a naiVe uninformed process.
The point, then, is surely: what insights
and advantages are there to this removal?
I submit here that ipso facto it causes
shortsightedness: we will have lost sight
of the whole. Without the end in view, we
more easily lose our way and even our
destination.
What is the advantage of retaining
production and using interpretation to
run grammar in the other direction? The
bias evident in doing so is well placed.
Messages are necessarily biased to the
encoder. If someone is confused with my
message, or stumbles on an ambiguity, I
have the sole right to expound my
semantic intention, to interpret the message for the listener, because I encoded it,
and if sober, know what I meant to say. It
does little good for a listener to contradict
me on that point, regardless of my
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"performance" errors. The choice, then, is
expressed in the question: Who better can
determine for us the meaning of a sentence, the encoder or the decoder? If the
answer is the decoder, then we should
follow interpretivism. If the answer is the
encoder, and I submit that it is, we then
follow deterministic production.
This appropriate meaning bias of the
encoder is reflected in starting with
Meaning, or Logical Form. The irony of
the label, using the term "form" in reference to a level of meaning, when in fact
the dichotomy of form versus meaning is
the most fundamental distinction in language, is further evidence of difficulty in
their point of view: the stated purpose of
Logical Form undoes itself in that it confuses form with meaning, and unwittingly becomes the second half of the very
production model Chomsky has so vehemently and persistently eschewed since
Syntactic Structures in 1956.

The Implication of a Terminal
Checkpoint
Logical Form (LF) and Phonetic Form
(PF) dovetail off of the syntactic component, because these have no input-output
relationship to one another; no information is to pass between them. Since Late
LF cannot feed PF, it is not possible to
insert lexical items in Late LF and expect
them to be "visible" to PF. This dovetail
is not even handed, however. Flaws
detected by either LF or PF can block a
given derivation. So this dovetail must,
in fact, reunite after the two components
have run their course. For example, PF
can continue finishing its work, while the
sentence is blocked in LF. PF does not
"know" this. Or vice versa, LF could pass
on a sentence that does not make it
through the checks in PF. I have to hear
from both camps, before I know the sentence has "converged" as GB calls it. The
checkpoint waits to hear from both wings
of the dovetail before it can pronounce
final judgment on the legitimacy of the
sentence being derived.

The fact that there is no information
passed between them is uneconomical,
for while a flaw is found in one component, the derivation may be continuing
successfully through the other component needlessly (since I now know that it
will be rejected anyway), thus overgenerating and wasting effort. If I am interested in an LF judgment on an illegal sentence, I can run the derivation through,
but that is an experimental procedure for
theoretic value rather than the usual state
of affairs of generating legal sentences
through the grammar. Except for experiments, the earlier I stop misgenerating,
the better off I am. Why bother finishing
work in one tail, when the sentence has
already crashed in the other?
If, on the other hand, we were to
allow PF or LF to tell the other as soon as
one of them crashed, we are right back
where we started on the issue. If LF can
tell PF it crashed, then why not let it tell
PF that it just checked scope and, as we
shall see below, may need to insert a
marker for it? Any communication turns
into all communication, and we lose the
reason for separating LF and PF into
incomunicado branches in the first place.
The PF-LF dovetail is a weakness in
the program, based quite frankly on a
stipulation that violates economy. Let us
now discuss economy outright.

The Economy Principle
My guiding light is the economy and
efficiency expressed in Occam's Razor. I
For example, I want to constrain any
excessive generative powers. It is wasteful to spend the energy of the grammar
building structures for a late filter when
an earlier one can intercept some of them
and reduce spoilage. It is also uneconomical to disperse filters throughout the
grammar if they can instead be consolidated. In that way, rules and checks are
invoked less often while managing the
same amount of control and functionality
that was intended by the insightful generalities that resulted from the analysis.
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Reducing duplication of effort is another economy. If a given semantic issue can
be determined earlier in the derivation
than waiting for Late LF, why maintain
such a second component with those
same abilities later on? Unless such a
duplication of effort is justified (not stipulated) it should be removed to promote
economy.
Overgeneration is another inefficiency.
It is wasteful of the grammar to overgenerate structures with mismatched and
illogical semantic markers in them, only
to wait until near the end of the job (Late
LF) to filter them out. If I have the information to exclude an illogical structure
earlier in the grammar, it is more efficient
to filter it out right then and there,
because it reduces the amount and frequency of the overgenerated spoilage. An
even better method would be to write the
rule (at that point in the grammar) in
such a way that a mismatch or illogical
structure is never generated at all.
Chomsky claims to support this principle:
Chomsky has suggested a condition
on derivations called the "least effort" condition, understood as part of an overarching principle of economy of derivation.
The interpretation of this condition ... is
that shorter derivations are always chosen
over longer ones. This is to say that, in a
situation where more than one derivation
is possible for a given sentence, the one
which involves [fewer] steps is chosen
over the others. (Ouhalla 1994, 305)

But he must not see that it also applies in
this case. In fact, one of the more amusing yet poignant pictures of excess in
such an endeavor is the story of the room
full of monkeys typing randomly away
under the statistical charge that over an
infinity of time they would produce a
typescript of Shakespeare's Twelfth Night.
While it is possible for an English major
to handle scrutiny of the output, it is
always being evaluated after the fact. It is
not heuristic; nothing drives the project
towards its goal, such as using human

typists could do. The project is not
improving on itself as it continues.
As an aside, Optimality Theory could
likewise learn a lesson from the monkeys.
It, too, generates a potential infinitude of
candidate forms in what has become linguistic history's worst case of overgeneration to date (see McOmber 1994). To the
extent that the checks-and-filters
approach is also conducted after the fact
and fails to provide intelligent causeeffect relationships in the output, such
grammar behaves like the room full of
monkeys. It behooves me then to prefer
rule and principle driven mechanisms
over randomized conundra. The latter is
perhaps the ultimate expression of ad hoc
at its very worst.
I have discussed economy as a guiding principle, even quoting Chomsky on
the point, though I insist on applying it
as broadly as possible. Let us now talk
about the challenge to the integrity of LF
that this creates, that is, the consistency of
rules in it when considering the overall
function and effect of the grammar.
Modular Integrity

Modular integrity in grammar compels
components to be more self-contained
than dispersed. If all meaning is consistently and only assigned in LF, I have a
more consolidated, integral module than
if only most of meaning is in LF. The latter would be a tremendously much more
complicated stipulation: I would be
forced to explain inconsistent boundaries-what criteria determine which
types of meanings wait for LF and which
ones come early? If any meaning is available early, then why not all? It would
become my burden to explain that.
If scope is being determined and
appealed to prior to the purview of LF,
then the modular integrity of LF has been
compromised. Still in all, when we find
such breaches, it behooves us to admit it
and repair the grammar. Far worse, and I
have seen this repeatedly, is analysis
where semantics is used, crucially, in the
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explanation of a phenomenon, and then
patently ignored as the rule is inserted
into the GB model. We will see several
cases of this below.
Chomsky's insistence on avoiding the
production model appears to create more
work for all of us who are searching for
one. For if his grammar is not production, then it is just another descriptive
grammar, a separate object from the production version, and we suppose that we
need both: one to explain grammar in
general, and the other to explain performance, both the flawed and the flawless.
On the other hand, if it turns out that a
production model of grammar does both,
as I submit it does, then we have killed
two birds with one stone and do not need
the other non-productive grammar at all:
Occam's Razor eliminates it.
Production and production issues are
a reality. They are a part of language, in
fact, they are at the core: the purpose of
language is to communicate. I produce
an utterance and you have to guess what
I meant. Then, vice versa, you respond
and now it is my turn to try and infer
your meaning based on what you say, by
retracing your surface structure back
through rules to your original meaning,
as I hope I have correctly managed to
determine. Of course, further exchanges
should allow us both to clarify our communication, and we learn the way each
of us expresses himself as though we
kept separate dictionaries on individual
nuance and style. We can and do.
Meaningful deterministic production
allows me to guide my grammatical
choices by knowing where I am headed.
What else, for example, guarantees that I
will ever generate a correct sentence if
there are no criteria determining the various rule applications along the way? It
makes more sense to allow semantics to
steer the course rather than hoping we
happen to have all the pieces we need by
the time we get to a Late LF. If I build a
structure based on the point I want to get
across in my message, then I can guaran-

tee that the utterance has in it what I
need. That is responsible communication.
Choices in the derivation are based on
that guiding meaningful point I wish to
convey. Other choices may instead be
based on morphological, computational
or phonetic conditioning. But to deprive
entire derivations of ever having input
from semantics until they are finished, is
an unfounded stipulation without merit.
The randomization it requires is both
uninsightful and extremely wasteful.
It disturbs the integrity of a Late LF,
however, to make semantic choices while
generating sentences, since such knowledge is not supposed to be available until
after the dovetail beyond S-Structure.
With this in mind, I now discuss the issue
of hindsight versus foresight which such
a dilemma inevitably raises.
Derivation: Hindsight versus
Foresight
I now submit, in good company from
other economical endeavors if not grammar, that foresight is superior to hindsight in making choices. Determined generation is much more economical than
filters separating out needless spoilage.
Otherwise we relegate human speech to
the status of a computerized restaurant
where robots follow no specific recipe but
cook at will, randomly combining ingredients, temperatures, and techniques.
Not to worry, we have tasters. Before any
of these concoctions is served, the maitre
d' takes a taste. He alone must either
serve the food, or else throw it in the
trash. But, crucially, he never talks to the
cooks! No feedback is allowed. He never
sends a soup back for more salt, or a rare
meat cut to be cooked till medium well as
the customer preferred. Never mind that
the customer is impatiently waiting for
his filet. He is not allowed to order anything, even if it is his choice of entree. He
just sits in the dining room hoping for
nourishment. There is, of course, no
guarantee that anything palatable ever
emerges from the kitchen. All the owner
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of the establishment can promise is the
probability that food of some sort will
eventually come. No one can tell him
when, what it might be, or how much
will pass inspection: hindsight cuisine at
its finest. In the meanwhile, the customer
is welcome to peruse a Shakespeare manuscript from the nearby simian typing
lab. It should be arriving any time now...
In the grammatical realm, GB is far
too similar. There is a "sentence taster" at
the terminal point where the dovetail
covertly rejoins. The would-be filters provide no heuristic feedback to refine the
grammar, to report what they have
learned that tastes good. There are several judiciously early points in GB where
available recipes could be followed and
issues easily resolved by appealing to
meaning. Recognizing a distribution of
available meaning sites throughout the
grammar is inconsistent with Late LF:
"we will serve no meaning before its
time."
On the other hand, such procedures
are evidence for Early LF since the
semantics it provides persist throughout
the derivation. I now present a crucial

case where a GB analysis invokes semantics prior to Late LF, the overt scope
marker rna of Bani-Hassan Arabic.
SEMANTICS PRIOR TO

LF

A semantic criterion prior to late LF is
the overt scope marker: overt means pronounced in PF and therefore visible to it.
But LF is deaf to PF, just as PF is blind to
LF. If I insert it early enough for PF to
have it, I am playing semantics out of
bounds, and LF calls foul. If I wait till LF,
PF won't see it or pronounce it.

Overt Scope Marking
Bani-Hassan Arabic provides an
example of the overt scope marker rna.
Kenstowicz (1989, 267££, displays renumbered) explains that there is an
LF rule ... that helps to characterize
the scope of expressions quantified by the
negative existential walla. When an NP
quantified by walla appears in postverbal
position the verbs must be preceded by
the particle rna (2, 3), which in other contexts marks sentential negation (1). But

Sentential Negation ma
(1) al ~aalib rna gara al ktaab.

'the student NEG read the book'
The student did not read the book.
Scope Marker rna:

Logical Form:

(2) al ~aalib rna gara walla ktaab.
'the student NEG read no book'
The student read no book.
= The student did not read any book.

walla ktaab i [al

(3) *al ~aalib gar a walla ktaab.
'the student read no book'

*walla ktaabi [al ~aalib gara ed

(4) walla ~aalib gar a al ktaab.
'no student read the book'
No student read the book.

walla ~aalibi [ei gara al ktaab]

(5) *walla ~aalib rna gara al ktaab.
'no student NEG read the book'

~aalib

ma gara ei]

*walla ~aalibi [ei rna gara al ktaab]

FROM MEANING 10 FORM AND BACK AGAIN

when the negatively quantified NP
appears in preverbal subject position (4)
the particle ma must be absent (5).

Kenstowicz determines that lima acts as a
scope marker indicating that the NP
quantified by walla has scope over the
verb" (268). In other words, ktaab can
now have scope over gara (and hence the
entire clause) despite its location lower in
the tree. In sentence 4 the higher scope is
already correct for walla taalib by virtue of
its higher position in the tree, so no
added ma is necessary, and is, in fact, crucially prohibited, as shown in sentence 5.
While the Kenstowicz material discusses the resultant semantics, it does not
explain how the structure was built in the
first place-how does ma get inserted,
and when is the particular position determined? For if scope cannot be determined until Late LF, I will not know till
then if I will need mao Yet if it is determined that I will in fact need it, how can I
insert it knowing it will then be invisible
to PF? It would not be pronounceable.
That is the paradox of an overt scope
marker in Chomsky's system. Chomsky's
way out is to randomly generate ma in
the room full of monkeys and hope one
of them types it in just the right spot.
That is patently uninsightful, because it
misses the generality that I do in fact
know where and when I should insert it,
at that point in the derivation. I am only
waiting by stipulation. By refusing to
address none but interpretive issues, and
thus only the second half of production,
Chomsky likewise misses insights and
generalities associated with that first half.
. The alternative is to determine scope
pnor to the dovetaiL But if scope can be
determined then, why redo it (duplication of effort) at LF? What does this
second determination gain me? And is
the earlier determination not an instance
of an LF-like function (i.e., an earlier LF)?
What is then the most efficient place in
the derivation for scope determination?
How can I eliminate a second (if needless) one?

Random generation of sentences with
ma scattered throughout would be wasted overgeneration. It simplifies LF to not
have to sort through all these if that can
be avoided.

Deriving the Walla Sentences
Let us walk through a derivation of
sentences like 1-5 above. In the subcategorization of the VO gara, I choose a DP to
be the patient/ object/ complement which
builds a V', another DP, to be the
agent/ subject/ specifier, which finishes
the complex as a VP. Either of the DPs
can be quantified by walla. Let us call a
VP with walla in Spec, a High Walla noting that the walla is higher in the tree.
VPs with a walla in their complement let
us call Low Walla VPs. Referring back to
sentences 2-5, High Walla structures have
scope over the V' by virtue of having this
higher position:

(6) Scope: The scope of A is the set of
nodes that A c-commands in the LF
representation. (Ouhalla 1994, 133)
This inherent or covert scope proper-

ty explains why High Walla constructions
will not need to have their scope marked
overtly with mao
At this point everything is fine, so far
so good, but now the grammar reaches
the ma-Insertion rule. Here is where the
paradox unfolds. Notice first, however,
that there is no GB step where some drastically new structure appears out of the
blue. The various "set[s] of nodes" with
all their c-commands which LF inherits
were built step by step under full view. It
is no surprise what structure LF gets,
because we have just built it. In other
words, as we are on our way to LF, we
can see what is c-commanding what, and
we realize what the implications will be.
When we make a move that will have
semantic implications later on down the
derivation, why wait to fix it, or waste
our time finishing a derivation which we
know will crash, when we can built it
properly in the first place?
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I have shown you the scope rule and
pointed out the advantage of perspicuity
made possible by looking ahead (alias
determinism). The reader is now, I
believe, equipped to steer into the
approaching storm and face the paradox
head on.

derivation. That is precisely what I mean
by a production model. Here speakers
know the thought they wish to convey,
and have it in mind as they formulate the
sentence.
I now consider the consequences of
each of these two, in turn.

The Approaching Storm

Alternative One: Random Insertion

There are two possible ways to execute rna-Insertion. On the one hand, I can
follow Chomsky and randomly insert rna
without regard to the consequences (the
consequences being the persistent
spoilage of the overgenerated forms I
know I will have to delete when I check
for scope at Late LF). That approach
would maintain a strict Late LF. The ad
hoc pretense, however, is that I do not
know what I am saying-that I cannot
intend a particular scope when I wish
to-and then guide the derivation
accordingly. I cannot look ahead.
Why am I inserting rna? In
Chomsky's approach, the grammar does
not care. Not only does it not care, it cannot guarantee that the insertion will ever
take place. There is only a theoretical
probability that the rna rule will ever be
chosen. Nothing, in fact, beyond the
infinitude of time and sample size, ever
guarantees in GB that I ever will generate
a rna. Instead of choosing wisely and
deliberately, I am asked to flip a (hopefully fair) coin. I have to gamble for
grammar!
The other choice, iconoclastic to GB,
is to check deliberately for scope now,
while I am on my way. This is what I call
determinism-the determinism of a production model. I have the information at
that point of the derivation, to determine
the correct choice, so I will use it. There
will be no need to filter out poor versions, because I won't choose any.
The point would be that I "know
enough" to do so (even though such
knowledge should be relegated to Late
Logical Form). The upshot, of course, is
that I even knew at the beginning of the

If I follow the first course and randomly insert rna, the only guarantee that I
will ever generate a sentence correctly
comes from the infinitude of statistical
probabilities of sheer chance. This technique is guilty of overgeneration since it
will just as likely produce as many incorrect sentences as correct, on a statistical
average. That is the coin toss effectheads: we insert rna, tails: we don't. Yes, it
is statistically possible, albeit rarer with
increasing n, but there is a 1 in 2 n chance
of generating the sequence of heads and
tails you chose. There are then only four
combinations I can generate. These are
shown in 7-10 below, with the corresponding examples repeated from sentences 2-5.
Only 8 and 9 are legal. In 8 since the
walla is high, it can function as the scope
marker and no walla is needed, in fact, it
is strictly disallowed in this reading. 2 In 9
walla needs to have scope over V' and
thus a Low Walla construction must be
marked overtly with rna.
This
review
completes
the
Kenstowicz (1989) material that is crucial
for the discussion here. 3 I claim that it is
inappropriate to allow grammars to ignorantly apply a rule in the face of a criterion that is available and could have been
applied. This is a heavy price to pay for
the stipulation that LF be postponed.
Sti pula tions should be reserved for
plugging loopholes until further insight
can be found.
We have seen random insertion,
which produces at least as many bad
structures as it does good ones. The other
alternative is deterministic insertion.

153

FROM MEANING 10 FORM AND BACK AGAIN

Examples

Possible Combinations
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

High walla
High walla
Low walla
Low walla

/
/
/
/

with ma
without ma
with ma
without ma

Alternative Two: Deterministic
Insertion
The overgeneration hypothesis allows
us to generate all four sentence types,
7-10, and then filter out the wrong ones
at Late LF. This rule for inserting ma in
such a grammar is also uninsightful. It
optionally inserts ma to the left of the
verb (e.g., in an adjunction to V') without
a motive.
If, however, I supply the motive,
which is to mark scope, then I am admitting that I can determine scope at such an
early point. That would be the informed
approach. Then the ma-Insertion Rule
"knows what it is doing" and only generates 8 and 9 without generating 7 and 10
because the rule does not apply. Such
insight has an impact on economy. of
derivation. For if I can and do "determme
scope" at such a point prior to SStructure, I have two ways to look at
what has happened. On the one hand, I
am, according to definition 6, to determine scope at LF, so LF must have come
earlier than expected. On the other hand,
Late LF is going to check to see that I did
the scope determination correctly when I
get down to the dovetail. If, as option .a, I
determined scope correctly, the check IS a
waste and that part of LF is useless. If on
the other hand, as option b, I determined
scope incorrectly, the ma-Insertion rule
itself is a waste as written and needs to
be fixed. But that is also not a permanent
contribution of a Late LF. Once the rule is
fixed, I am back to option a for a useless
Late LF. Notice, moreover, that I cannot
let Late LF repair a faulty 10 by supplying the missing ma, because invisible PF
can never know about the change and
will mispronounce the output. Likewise,
Late LF cannot repair a faulty 7 by deleting an extraneous ma for the same reason.

*walla taalib ma gara al ktaab. (5)
walla taalib gara al ktaab. = (4)
al taalib ma gara walla ktaab = (2)
*al taalib gara walla ktaab = (3)
I have presented the data and analysis and explained the consequences to the
model. I will now summarize these into a
restatement of the paradox.

The Paradox
The paradox in GB's dovetail is this:
if I mark scope with ma in LF, I cannot
hear ma in PF. If I hear ma in PF, it must
have been inserted prior to LF, and therefore prior to the dovetail at S-Structure.
That would mean that a meaningful
semantic-based act occurred prior to the
semantic component. The data show that
the marker is phonetic yet also semantic.
How can it be both? The one contradicts
the other in GB.
This paradox in the theory hinges on
the principle of economy of derivation. If
scope is determined only at Late LF, .we
have an uninsightful and overgeneratmg
insertion rule. It is uninsightful because it
inserts randomly, ignoring the very criterion which will be considered in a module that is placed later by stipulation. It
overgenerates because the probability ~f
the random event with two outcomes IS
1/2, and even that assumes that structures without the scope marker occur as
frequently as those with it.
If scope is determinable earlier than
S-Structure, providing insight to maInsertion would thereby reduce the overgeneration. It eliminates the need for a
Late LF filter and eventually depletes the
reason for having Late LF at all. For Late
LF only duplicates checking processes
that have gone on before, I will want to
eliminate these by the same principle of
economy as Chomsky invokes for his
Minimalism.
All this conflict is resolved by Early
LF, which captures the best of both
worlds. Early LF recognizes the Meaning
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level which drives many choices. It
allows the rna-Insertion to be insightful. It
precludes overgenerating 7 and 10.
The simplest way out of the paradox
is to move the scope function to the earlier position. Let us now look more closely
at the Early LF solution and its
economies to the grammar.

The Solution: Early LF
To look at the economy of an Early LF
solution, let us look at the trade-off in
eliminating the filter that was checking
for illegal occurrences of rna.
In the Late LF model, the correct
example in 2 above, repeated here as It
successfully passes a filter:

(11)

walla ktaab i [al taalib rna gara ei]

This LF shows the quantified ktaab in
scope over a clause in which it is otherwise subordinate. In such a case, the filter
checks for rna to the left of the verb. Let
us call this the rna-Scope Filter, and the
principle behind this filter the rna-Scope
Principle. Thus 11 is deemed to be a legal
sentence. However, the putative LF for
the incorrect 3, *al taalib gara walla ktaab,
does not pass the filter for lack of rna:

(12)

*walla ktaab i [al taalib gar a ei]

Rather than waste the derivation, however, why not let the very rna-Principle
which provides the filter provide a remedial rule instead? Rather than having the
principle create a filter, have it create a
rule, the rna-Scope Rule. Then, rather than
throwing 7 away, I repair it by correctly
inserting the rna to the left of the verb:
In an Early LF grammar, rather than
Quantifier Raising, I have its mirror
image, Quantifier Lowering, which
replaces the bound variable ei with its
quantifier walla ktaabi :
(13)

This gives us the correct 2. I have just
traded a filter for a rule. In so doing, I
avoid overgenerating 3 which gets
filtered out. That adds economy by
reducing wasted by-product. The rnaScope Rule indirectly "checks" for 3 by
deriving it into correct 2. In fact, that is
the only way 2 is derived. There is no
reason to have rna in the sentence until
the rna-Scope Principle puts it there. It
explains both why (the scope) and how
(the insertion) rna is found in that position. Since this principle is semantic,
however, it belongs in an LF module.
When LF is early, it can insert items and
they can persist to PF.
In the Late LF model, I am left with
the inconsistency that a scope marker
inexplicably may be inserted in a previous component of the grammar but not
be checked until I have spent energy
deriving the entire S-Structure. If the rna
was not inserted according to a proper
analysis of scope, just how was the insertion decided? Could it also have been
misplaced as well, say, as in 14?
(14)

* al taalib gara rna walla ktaab

Why should the grammar allow 14 to
persist into later components and undergo anymore scrutiny or derivation?
If LF cannot feed PF, it should not be
possible to insert lexical items in LF, for
they will be phonetically invisible. Yet if
it is in LF that scope is determined, it is
only at that point (or one subsequent to
it) that such a marker can in fact be
knowledgeably placed. What determines
the placement otherwise? If placement is
random, I am overworking the filter,
because the grammar by chance will
wastefully generate many more incorrect
structures (which will have to be weeded
out) than correct ones. In a program with

Derivation of (2) al taalib rna gara walla ktaab:
(a) Given:
walla ktaabi [al taalib gara ei]
walla ktaab i [al taalib rna gara ed
(b) Apply rna-Scope:
(c) Quantifier Lowering:
ei [al taalib rna gara [walla ktaab i ]]
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Late LF, the marker will have to be inserted prior to the dovetail in order for PF to
pick it up and spell it out phonetically.
That is the paradox of making semantic
decisions prior to the semantic component itself. I am faced either with loss of
modular integrity or with overgeneration.
There is no loss of economy by moving the filter earlier and turning it into a
rule. If a scope marker inserted for
semantic reasons, it must be in LF. If it is
heard, it must insert prior to PF.
Therefore, LF must occur prior to PF.
Quantifier Lowering can provide D- and
S-Structures so that LF does not need to
follow these. Therefore, it can be the earliest module of all. That is the escape
from the paradox. Let us now look at
other consequences of an Early LF
program.
All of the problems above are simplified or solved when the LF component
is placed first. That is, if the derivation
runs from Meaning to Form as the utterance is composed, then the decoder's
task is to decompose this from the given
Form back again to its intended Meaning.
I have pointed this out as I went. Here
now are some additional consequences of
Early LF.

Semantic Selection and Theta-Roles
An additional consequence of Early
LF concerns another semantic pretense,
similar to the scope case above. This time
I address the semantic selection and
theta-roles, a very early function and
hence an interesting one if LF is going to
narrowly precede it. Notice the appeals
to meaning and even determination in
the following explanation:
S-selection is largely determined by
the inherent meaning (the conceptual
structure) of lexical items. The verb (or
concept) hit, for example, entails two participants ... s-selection operates in terms
of semantic categories, called thematic
roles or theta-roles. (Ouhalla 1994, 125
emphasis added)

It violates modular integrity to claim
that the Theta Criterion" applies at LF ...
but extend[s] to other levels of syntactic
representation by virtue of the Projection
Principle" (Ouhalla 1994, 126), because I
am then also forced to conclude also that
LF is "essentially a syntactic level of representation" (126). Late LF looks more
syntactic than necessary because it must
take S-Structure as input. By contrast,
Early LF is relieved of all but the most
transparent S-Structures because the
rules from S-Structure have not even
applied yet. Therefore, Early LF is less
syntactic, overall, than Late LF. That promotes economy.

Logical Subjects and Objects
Reference to logical subjects and
objects also belongs to LF, since logic is a
part of semantics. An appeal is made to
these concepts, for example, to explain
the DP movement in long passives-"the
term 'subject' is used here in both its
structural sense ... and its semantic
sense" (Ouhalla 1994, 78f emphasis
added). Then why position LF so far
down the derivational track from yet
another fairly early point (as early as DStructure), when in fact it would serve to
have it available as soon as the first mention of semantic is made? GB's answer is
supposed to be that such is the exclusive
domain of LF and that (per modular
integrity) this shall not be violated.
While such persistence seems to promote consistency at this point, I now turn
to an issue where it does not fair well at
all: the issue of reconstruction effects.
Reconstruction Effects
Late LF structures have a lot of SStructure material in them that is not relevant to a determination of meaning and
do not enter into LF considerations. By its
very nature, Late LF first inherits SStructure as is, and is then allowed only
covert movements to get the job done of
determining meaning. But much of the
idiosyncracies of language have already
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been encoded, so to speak, into the various adjustments made since D-Structure.
Early LF would not burdened with these,
because they result from rules that would
not have applied yet.
Chomsky (1995, 71 display renumbered) debates whether to allow reconstruction effects, or to admit that LF is
not doing it job alone:
Some semantic properties ... appear
to be determined by S-Structure ... independently ... of the LF component. Let P
be such a property. Then two accounts
are possible.
(15)

a. P holds at S-Structure
b. P holds at LF under
reconstruction, that is,
with the moved phrase
treated "as if" it were
in the position of its trace.

In fact, either alternative is ultimately
fatal for Late LF: 15a patently so, for if SStructure is allowed to do some of the
semantic work, then why not D-Structure
also, in which case, let D-Structure do all
of it to avoid loss of modular integrity and
turn it into Early LF with all its efficiencies. On the other hand, if we opt for
reconstruction, then we will need the
inefficiency of additional mechanisms to
support it.
Reconstruction involves structures
with a moved element, NP for instance,
(16)

where structural relationships (linear
precedence and c-command) are crucial
to determine the antecedents of various
pronouns (see Chomsky 1995, 73f).
In 16a he c-commands John and therefore cannot take John as its antecedent.
That is expected. Likewise in 16b he does
not c-command who or its trace e so that
he could in fact refer to the same person,
or not. The lack of c-command prevents
the restriction against co-reference. There
are two meanings possible, 17a and b.
The reconstruction effect comes in
with 16c. In that sentence, whose is not ccommanded by he either, and yet
Chomsky does not want it taken as its
antecedent. 4 His point is then that whose
father acts as if it is in the original (premoved) position, because then he clearly
c-commands whose and is supposed to
preclude co-reference.
Notice, however, that if whose father
has been moved to the left for
S-Structure, and we are having to move it
back for LF to interpret it, that we could
have interpreted it back before it moved
in the first place. In other words, this is
another duplication of effort violation.
Moving the NP back to its trace, duplicates the earlier level where the NP was.
That first position is therefore meaningful, and the moved position is not.
Refusing to use the meaningfulness of
that first position is not principled, but
only a stipulation of GB. Notice that if
16b is reconstructed into 19, no ill effects

a. They said he admires John's father.
b. Who i rei said he admires John's father]?
c. Guess [whose fatherJi [they said he admires ei].

He #- John
He #- whose

(17)

a. Someonei said hei admires John's father, who i is it?
b. Someonei said hej#-i admires John's father, who i is it?

(18)

Guess

(19)

_ _ [[Who] said he admires John's father]?

(20)

Guess [whose fatherJi [they said he admires [whose fatherJi].

[they said he admires [whose father]].
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result for interpretation 19 because the ccommand relations were not disturbed.
The so-called copying solution to
reconstruction is even less promising.
The item is not actually moved in this
have-your-cake-and -ea t -it-too approach,
but rather copied to its new location. This
preserves original c-command relationships. Presumably only the copy is discarded in LF, and only the original is discarded in PF. But that is also why it is
inefficient: the two NPs look in 20 like
they are on equal footing, yet the grammar, as we have just stated, will treat
them with bias just like before when it
gets to the dovetail, with PF taking the
copy," and LF the erstwhile trace (original). It is still an instance of preserving
the earlier structure in some way (as in
Early LF) in order to use that structure
later to help with interpretation.
Reconstruction raises the issue of
whether Late LF is really doing its job.
Another indication that it is not, after all
is. said and done, comes from Chomsky
himself, and deserves brief mention.

Defective Convergence
After following numerous arguments
for a variety of structures that depend on
GB's Late LF for interpretation, it is disturbing to learn that even if a structure
successfully converges (both LF and PF
terminate without crashing), it can still
"receive a defective interpretation" or otherwise end up as "semigibberish"
(Chomsky 1995,200, emphasis added).
If LF cannot complete the task of
interpretation, why even bother? What
does it mean to say that a structure has
successfully converged through the interpretation component, if the interpretation
is then defective? That is imponderable
absurdity. On the other hand, Late LF, if
switched to Early LF, ends up at the location of D-Structure. Do we then both
Early LF and D-Structure? I turn to that
topic next.

Extraneous D-Structure
Another advantage of Early LF is that
it allows me to eliminate a level of repre-

sentation. D-Structure now becomes an
arbitrary point on the way from Early LF
to S-Structure. The notion that DStructure is the level "where all categories are in the positions where they are
expected to be" (Ouhalla 1994, 56) and
that S-Structure moves or chains them
away is circular: they are where we
expect, because we stipulate our expectations into the rules as we write them. If
we can then apply said rules accurately,
we can hardly be surprised if the outputs
are now where we expect.
Where does that leave the Arabic rna
particle? How do I decide where to
expect rna to be in D-Structure if I cannot
determine requisite scope until a Late
LF? But notice that since "expected positions" refers to the accurate output of
previous rules, Early LF places things
where they belong sooner in the derivation. There is no arbitrary point along the
way from Early LF to S-Structure to claim
as an independent D-Structure level. SStructure rules can take us directly to the
surface. D-Structure is thus extraneous.
We have seen a simplification in the
modules of the grammar, as relates to
general levels in the derivation. Now let
us look at the change in licensure this
brings, in the case of parasitic gaps.

Parasitic Gaps
Parasitic gaps are licensed at SStructure by a variable which does not ccommand it, a condition "sometimes
called the anti-c-command condition"
(Ouhalla 1994, 218, notation adjusted).
However, we are told that this licensure
is not to apply beyond S-Structure into
LF. Variables which arise from QR at Late
LF are unable to license such a gap:
(21)

S-structure:
*1 forgot who filed every / which
articlei without reading ei
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Late LF:
*every /which articlei [I forgot
who filed ei [without reading [pil]]
where pi is parasitic on ei. Ouhalla (1994,
219) wisely comments that the parasitic
gap licensure restriction "should be
derivable from some general and independent principles, although it is not
easy to see how" given Chomsky's
framework. With Early LF, however, the
licensure can be invoked at the appropriate point in the derivation and stay valid
through to the end, without backwashing
into the earlier invalid levels of Meaning.
Early LF never interferes with subsequent licensure authorities of S-Structure,
because S-Structure follows rather than
precedes Early (but not Late) LF.
I have presented several additional
points that Early LF resolves economically. Another issue affecting economy is
procrastination of rule application.

Procrastinate versus Expedite
Procrastination is a Chomskyan
(1995, 228) principle that delays doing
something until the last possible point. I
prefer to expedite functions in order to
build the most efficient grammar (MEG)
possible (McOmber 1979). Switching
from a principle of procrastinate to expedite
supports moving LF early as well.
Instead of waiting until LF (as in English)
to check features because they are strong
(see Cook and Newson 1996) the features
will have been used to drive the correct
morphology in the first place, thus more
cost avoidance for the grammar.
Chomsky's Greed principle follows a
similar fate. Instead of node hopping to
feature check, I treat all agreement as
post-semantic feature copying (see Chafe
1970, ch. 5ff). After choosing "the tasty
tacos" from the Spanish lexicon I copy
masculine and plural information from
"taco-s" over to "tasty" and "the." I
change underlying I taco-s sabroso to l-o-s
taco-s sabroso-s. Why bother generating el,
las, la and then "check" to eliminate the

wrong ones after the fact, when the information is at my finger tips? I have
already decided to say taco-s as a plural
since I determined there are more than
one of them. How far away from production dare we move-and what does it
accomplish? Whatever other abstractions 6
we achieve, we must eventually deal
with production to explain how language
communicates. And why not start with
this end in mind?
Tasty tacos is an example of deliberate feature copying versus post hoc feature checking. Now let us look at a longer
distance phenomenon, (dis)anaphora.

Disanaphora
Other examples of scope that are
overtly marked in PF, are the intonational
variances we use to create what is traditionally labeled contrastive emphasis, as
in these examples from McOmber (1977
and 1978):
(22) a. The boys who are poor need money,
but the others don't.
{B n -PI
b. The bays who are poor need money,
but the others don't.
{-B n P}
c. The boys who are poor need money,
but the others don't.
- {B n P}

The emphatic intonation on poor or
on boys or both, each leads to a respective
difference in meaning for the reference of
the complementary disanaphor others:
(23) a. {B n -PI means that
others = boys (but not any girls)
b. {-B n P} means that
others = poor girls (no boys)
c.

~{B

n P} means that

others = rich boys and poor girls
The phonetic signals necessary to
interpret data in 22 is heard in PF, but
Late LF is deaf to these. Here are further
examples based on Williams (1997, 605):
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(24) a. *Sue wore a blue gown knowing
Jill would wear a red one.
b. Sue wore a blue gown, knowing
Jill would wear a red one.
In 24, one is anaphoric to gown, while
blue is disanaphoric to red, in deliberate
contrast. This pairing sets up a contrastive emphasis in the intonation that is
used even for numeric data (619 mutatis
mutandis):
(25)

a. " .. .then dial extension 8 434."
(eight four three four)
b. " .. .then dial extension *8434."
(eight four three four)

As an aside, Williams finally concludes that LF = PF. In other words, for
him there should be no dovetail. Such a
move would overcome the disability of
LF to hear crucial phonetic clues, but
would not solve the blind overgeneration
problems discussed above, nor the resulting problems of semiproduction GB
incurs when we generate structures randomly, ignoring available semantic determinants. Therefore, while I agree that
there is no dovetail, the fact that Late LF =
PF is even clearer from a production
model: the PF heard is actually the beginning point of interpretation (the erstwhile
LF); that is, on the hearer's track tracing
and analyzing Form back into Meaning.

Zero Syntax
I modify Zero Syntax (pace Pesetsky
1995) to show that structures fresh out of
Deep Meaning look like his layered structures, and then are linearized (it la
Chafre) into the cascade-like trees as we
proceed toward Surface Form. I am thus
resurrecting Groat (1992) in a crucially
mirrored image to obviate the fatal flaw
Pesetsky found. I also depart from Groat
with my Early LF.

Summary of Evidence for Early LF
I have presented several examples of
issues that promote simplicity and economy in an Early LF. After explaining the
Arabic overt scope marker, I also took a
look at the concept of "logical" subjects
and objects, the irony of reconstruction
effects, the extraneity of D-Structure, the
struggle of parasitic gaps, then I contrasted the principle of GB's procrastination
with MEG's Expedite-all in the name of
economy to the grammar. Finally, an
additional example of clash between PF
and LF shows up with the contrastive
emphasis of disanaphora.
In every case, it is possible for GB to
obviate the (efficient) position of Early
Meaning by overgenerating and filtering
out. Even if such filters appear equivalently accurate, and I do not argue that
moot issue, the determinative Early LF
model is, ceteris paribus, a more highly
valued grammar, judging by Occam's
Razor.
Having reviewed evidence for Early
LF, I now recapitulate my conclusions.
CONCLUSIONS

The scope of this paper is to argue on
Early Logical Form. As I continue to
repair the GB model, at the risk of pouring "new wine into old bottles," I see that
after moving LF, there is no longer a
clean point which I can distinctly call DStructure. It is, in a sense, absorbed by LF
(I could use either label). Then there is little motivation for calling the midpoint
"S-Structure," in particular, since it is just
as much surface of the meaning component as
it is the deepest level of final form. New
labels would be more insightful and all
the more conveniently abbreviated.
If I have Early Logical Form, this is
the meaning end of the processing. The
encoder has a meaning in mind and
wants to express this into a surface Form.
The gamut then runs from Early or Deep
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Meaning, through all the semantic and
postsemantic processing (a la Chafe 1970).
Then I arrive at the Late(st) or "Surface"
Meaning. That comprises the boundary
between Meaning and Form. Late
Meaning is Early Form; that is, the end of
the first module is the very starting point
of the second. Let us simply call it the
Midpoint, with that understanding that it
is the "Checkpoint Charlie" between the
two. Then from Early Form I have various
phonological processes that take me
finally to the surface: Late (Surface) Form.
That is how I encode a sentence. The listener, to decode, runs backward through
the derivation to arrive at the early
"deep" meaning which was conveyed.
The decoder must retrace steps, disambiguate, and in a real sense undo the
derivation as it was encoded in the first
place, running back again, from Form to
Meaning.
Let me reiterate that I am following
the economy principle of Occam's Razor
which leads me to (1) avoid duplication of
effort, (2) avoid overgeneration with its
spoilage and extraneous filters, (3) promote
modular integrity, which tells me to keep
LF intact, rather than splitting it between
scope insertions and scope filters, (4) promote perspicuity, changing hindsight to
foresight wherever possible, to add
insight and oversight to the various
processes in lieu of random ones that
ignore available criteria, (5) equate Late
Meaning with Early Form, and (6) use a
processing model that follows the flow
from speaker to listener (encoder to
decoder) or back again, by running forward or backward respectively through
the paradigm.
The undoing of Late LF model was
based on the patent impossibility of having an overt scope marker, computed in
LF but paradoxically invisible to pronunciation at PE Moving LF to the front of the
derivation precludes the paradox but
changes the scope (pun intended) of LF
considerably, from an interpretive to a
deterministic production model. The code

then runs from Meaning to Form and
back again.
My conclusion is to abandon all interpretivistic models in favor of the most
efficient grammar possible: a bilateral production model. It first encodes a sentence
from Meaning to Form: that is expression.
It then reverses the process back again to
decode, from (the given) Form back to
Meaning: that is interpretation. It is ironic,
then, to compare this picture with
Chomsky's interpretivism and realize that
his is actually a partial production model.
Interpretation is always a decoding
process. That is, it is the search for the
original meaning of the message, that is
lurking somewhere behind the form.
Interpretation takes place on an utterance
that was built with some original meaning
in mind as the driving force generating
the structure. Chomskyan interpretation is
possible, at the end of his derivation, but
he crucially leaves out of the derivation
the original occurrence of the very interpretation that the encoder used in the first
place, and for which the decoder now
seeks. How much better for the grammar
to run through the rules, produce an interpretation, and then match this with the
original as a proof. For grammar to otherwise become so abstract that it manipulates structures while abstaining from
recognition of the meaning that underlies
those forms, is to take from grammar its
very raison d'etre: that grammar is the tool
used to express thought into language.

NOTES
1. Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, roughly

"necessity is the mother of complexity" -William of
Occam, ca. 1285-1349, a Franciscan minimalist, probably
did not invent the phrase, but quoted it so effectively and
so often that it has since been attributed to him honoris
causa. Following St. Francis all the more closely, he struggled with the Pope (John XXII) over various issues, who
in turn excommunicated him. True to form, William
responded with a treatise showing that the logic used in
his own excommunication entailed that the Pope was a
heretic himself.
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2. The other possible reading, [there is] no student

---.1979. A new look at grammar. Paper presented at

[who] did not read the book, uses sententialma which is

the 1979 Symposium of The Deseret Language and

then the standard negative. The double negatives cancel,

Linguistics Society at Brigham Young University,

meaning that all the students read the book.

Provo, Utah.

3. His data were given to discuss extraction with the
null subject parameter. My focus with his data, however,
is on how and where the mil comes to be inserted itself.
4. Again, this is according to Chomsky: hoist with

- - - . 1994. A pessimistic look at Optimality Theory.
University of Utah. Typescript.
Pesetsky, David. 1995. Zero Syntax: experiencers and cas-

cades. Cambridge: MIT Press.

his own petard. I see a possible answer where he does in

Ouhalla, Jamal. 1994. introducing Transformational

fact refer to whose: "You'll never guess whose father he

Grammar: From rules to principles and parameters.

admires: his own!" Our point here is not to explain the
structure our way, but to use Chomsky's own accepted
evidence to refute himself.
5. To make matters worse, instead of just saying
that the moved piece was copied into its new place, the
literature still claims to the moved NP was completely
moved away (deleted from its original position), and that
the original was then restored by having copied the
moved version back. That spends (wastes) twice the
effort. Let the reader imagine word processing that way.
6. In fact, government itself (the G of GB) is also at
risk. Last reports are that it can no longer remain "as a
fundamental notion of the theory" (Cook and Newson
1996,316).
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